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A classic set of results in the theory of international trade involves the linkages
between goods prices and factor prices. Indeed, basic theorems on these linkages
in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model (Jones 1965,1971; Mussa 1974;
Lloyd 1998 ) have served as the theoretical underpinnings for the now massive
literature on globalization and relative wages (Feenstra and Hanson 2004)1. In-
equality concerns have long been theoretically regarded as a determinant of trade
policy behaviour (see Baldwin 1989). More recently, policy interest has driven
applied research on linkages between economic integration and household inequal-
ity. This literature includes both econometric and numerical modeling approaches,
building on the growing availability of comparable household survey data (Winters
2001,2003; Hertel et al 2004)2. The bulk of the combined literature is focused on
interactions between integration and the functional distribution of income.
In this paper, we develop a dual approach to analyzing general equilibrium
relationships between trade policy and the household (as distinct from the func-
tional) distribution of income. This includes the introduction of a social welfare
function into the dual GE system grounded in the literature on social welfare and
inequality. In particular, it is built from individual household preferences and is ex-
plicitly separable between mean income and income dispersion.3 This then follows
1Comprehensive surveys are also provided by Richardson (1995) and Cline (1997).
2Also see Edwards (1997), Higging and Williamson (1999), Barro (2000) and Spilimbergo, A.,
Londo˜ no J. and M. Sz´ ekely (1999).
3While the literature on general equilibrium trade policy has been linked to factor incomes
since at least the Stopler-Samuelson theorem, as far as we are aware the introduction of Sen-type
social welfare functions into general equilibrium trade models (i.e. with an explicit separability
into mean and dispersion components) dates from our own earlier papers, which we build on
here. See Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2003, 2004, 2005). Also see Anderson (2002). While
his paper is focused on a diﬀerent set of issues (his goal is to explore the public ﬁnance concept
of the marginal cost of funds in general equilibrium), he does use ethical weights to stress the
1through to the government objective function. For government, this is manifested
not only in special interest politics, but also through the direct impact of inequality
on a government’s objective function. What we highlight here is how general equi-
librium distributional aspects of social welfare related to import protection may
be examined alongside corresponding eﬃciency aspects in a dual framework. An
advantage of the dual approach is that it ultimately leads to a mapping of policy-
induced price changes into household inequality for a broad class of models that
may have potential for empirical application. For government, the factors driving
protection are manifested not only in special interest politics, but also through
the direct impact of inequality on a government’s objective function. We ﬁnd that
equity considerations may serve to counter lobbying interests in both capital-rich
and capital-poor countries, though with an opposite marginal impact on the ﬁnal
policy outcome. We also identify a protectionist bias on the part of welfare maxi-
mizing governments in capital rich countries. This is based on inequality aversion,
rather than the risk aversion-based protectionist bias identiﬁed by Fernandez and
Rodrik (1991). Although we focus our attention on import tariﬀs, the main mes-
sage that follows from this approach can be applied in a more general context
of trade policy instruments. The precise distributional and eﬃciency components
may change, but in essence the trade-oﬀ and interrelation between both economic
outcomes is still present. The dual approach allows us to be relatively general in
terms of model structure, while also allowing a more parsimonious representation
of basic relationships in the n-sector case that generalizations based on a primal
approach. We follow Bourguinon and Morrison (1989, 1999) and use an ownership
decomposition of general equilibrium welfare eﬀects of raising public funds into a composition
(i.e. eﬃciency) eﬀect and a distributional eﬀect.
2matrix that allows us to move from functional to household income. We then
obtain a dual representation of the household income distribution in terms of en-
dowments, tariﬀs and the ownership structure. Using this analytical framework,
we analyze the impact of trade and tariﬀs. Treating equity issues as relevant, we
follow Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2003, 2004, 2005) and work with Sen (1974)
type social welfare functions. This approach lets us work from micro-foundations
to embed inequality indexes in the social welfare function. In particular, we work
with the widely used Gini coeﬃcient andwith the Atkinson (1970) family of in-
equality indexes, although other indexes may be employed. Using this framework
we are able to decompose the general equilibrium import protection eﬀects into
real income level and dispersion changes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a formal representation
of social welfare inclusive of income inequality. In Section 3, we embed this social
welfare function into a dual general equilibrium trade model. We also develop
the equilibrium representation of inequality, based on the dual representation of
general equilibrium system fundamentals. Section 4 then explores linkages be-
tween trade policy, inequality, and welfare. It also examines theoretical linkages
between country size, development, policy, and inequality. In Section 5, we explore
the implications of the addition of inequality to the social welfare component of
a government’s objective function for political support function models of tariﬀ
formation. We conclude in Section 6.
32 Deﬁning social welfare as including inequality
Our goal in this section is to develop a functional linkage between inequality and
aggregate (social) welfare. This will then be integrated in the next section into
a dual general equilibrium trade model. A critical condition for inequality to
have a meaningful link to aggregate (social) welfare is that the utility function be
strictly concave with respect to income. Additionally, for tractability we prefer to
work with a social welfare function that is symmetric and additively separable in
individual utilities.
The existence of social welfare functions depends crucially on the possibility
to compare interpersonal utility levels. One such possibility is oﬀered by the ‘veil
of ignorance’ approach ﬁrst proposed by Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and further devel-
oped by Rawls (1971), where we rank diﬀerent individual situations not knowing
which would be the actual situation. As stated by Sen (1997) this interpersonal
comparison can be deﬁned as those situations where we make judgements of the
type:
”I would prefer to be person A rather than person B in this situation”
and ”while we do not really have the opportunity (or perhaps the mis-
fortune, as the case may be) of in fact becoming A or B, we can think
quite systematically about such a choice, and indeed we seem to make
such comparisons frequently”.
Because GDP per capita is the most common indicator of social welfare, the
‘veil of ignorance’ approach supports the use of an inequality measure to comple-
ment GDP per capita comparisons. If we do not know which individual household
we are in a speciﬁc country, then the expected utility becomes a function of mean
4income and the personal distribution of income. How we evaluate the probability
of receiving any given income is then determined by the functional representation
of the utility function and more speciﬁcally by the degree of concavity of this func-
tion. In this context, a natural extension of cross-country welfare comparisons is
to complement GDP per capita levels with some measure of inequality.4
Under the social welfare approach to income distribution measurement, in-
equality is associated with variance in the distribution of income. This raises
two measurement problems. The ﬁrst is that we cannot generally rely on ﬁrst
moment-based indicators. The second is that even though the concepts of Lorenz-
dominance and general Lorenz-dominance (Shorrocks, 1983) are accepted as ways
to impartially rank two diﬀerent distributions5, in many cases the Lorenz-curves
intersect at least once, so that we obtain incomplete ranking of distributions. To
solve both these problems, inequality indexes are usually used to rank distribu-
tions in indeterminate cases and to provide a summary variable that can be used in
empirical models. While the most commonly used is the Gini coeﬃcient, most in-
equality measures are implicitly based on a social welfare function (Dalton (1920);
Kolm (1969); Atkinson (1970)). As such, there is no perfect index, and any index
has built in social preferences.
In this paper, we employ two representations of household utility and social
welfare. Both reﬂect Sen’s (1974) preferred deﬁnition of social welfare as:
SW = y (1 − I) (1)
where SW is the social welfare, y is mean income, and I is an index of inequality.
4This approach was formally treated by Sen (1976).
5See Lambert (1993) for details.
5Starting with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences yields the
well-known Atkinson inequality index directly as a natural metric for a mapping
from income distribution to social welfare (see Atkinson citeyearAtk70). In this
sense, Atkinson’s index ﬁts naturally into Sen’s proposed social welfare function.
Sen actually oﬀered equation (1) as deﬁned with respect to the Gini coeﬃcient.
In this case, the social welfare function is axiomatic, in that we do not have an ob-
vious mapping –through aggregation– from individual preferences to an aggregate
social welfare function. This follows because the social welfare function is then
rank sensitive. We work with both the Atkinson index and Gini coeﬃcient in this
paper.
2.1 The Atkinson index-based social welfare function
Formally, we deﬁne a composite consumer good over the range of all consumption
goods, which follows from a linear homothetic aggregation function. As such, cost
minimization yields a composite consumer price index. This is deﬁned over all
consumer prices pc.
pc = f (p) (2)
Household utility uh is deﬁned as a function of household consumption of the







6We next map aggregate individual utility to aggregate welfare φ, which is deﬁned























1−θ if θ 6= 1
lnch if θ = 1
(6)
In general, we assume that θ > 0, and in this paper we focus on the case where
θ 6= 1.7 We employ a simple linear transformation, and are then able to deﬁne a
social welfare index in per-capita terms.











Simple manipulation then yields social welfare as a function of per-capita income







6In the present context, constant relative inequality aversion (CRIA) is a better label and
acronym.
7One gets the same basic results with log preferences. Estimates in the macro literature are
that θ is less than 1.
7With some further manipulation, our equality measure EA can be mapped directly
to the Atkinson index of income inequality, yielding a Sen-type social welfare
function. In particular, taking the deﬁnition of the Atkinson index, we have the
following relationships between the Atkinson index IA, EA, and social welfare.























Note that as θ → 0 only average income matters, rather than income inequal-
ity. Alternatively, when θ → ∞, then SWA = min
 
yh
and we have the extreme
Rawlsian maximin social welfare function, where the income level of the poor-
est individual is the only relevant variable and average income is unimportant.
Moreover, for a given distribution (measured as shares of total income) we have
declining marginal utility of income.
2.2 The Gini index-based social welfare function
The Gini coeﬃcient is deﬁned as twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the
45-degree line. As such, (1 − G) is then twice the area below the Lorenz curve.
Formally, this index is deﬁned as follows:
































8where we have arranged households so that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yn. Unlike the
Atkinson-based social welfare function, the Gini-based social welfare function em-
bodies asymmetry not on speciﬁc individuals, but rather on relative income rank-
ings. This ranking provides the concavity of the utility function with respect to
income. The higher the income in the ranking, the less social weight it has. At the
same time, equation (12) is linear in average income. As such, SWG is relatively
more sensitive to mean income than SWA and less sensitive to inequality.
3 Inequality and trade in general equilibrium
To explore the interaction between production, trade and trade policy, and inequal-
ity, we work with a modiﬁed dual representation of trade in general equilibrium
(Dixit and Norman 1980). To do so, we ﬁrst adopt the following additional set of
assumptions:
• Rational behavior by households and ﬁrms.
• Complete and perfectly competitive markets.
• Convex technology, with neoclassical production functions.
• Goods are tradable and factors are not.
• Every household has the same neoclassical technology for producing the com-
posite consumption good.
Given these assumptions, we are able to deﬁne the core general equilibrium
system for demand and production in terms of expenditure and revenue functions,
with expenditure deﬁned in terms of the composite consumption good. Social
9welfare then follows as a set of side equations from the core general equilibrium
system.
3.1 The core general equilibrium system
Because we assume that all households have the same consumption technology
deﬁned with respect to the composite consumption good, we can drop the house-
hold index from consumption and represent aggregate expenditure as a function
of aggregate consumption and prices:
e(p,c) = c · f (p) (13)
On the production side, we assume standard neoclassical production functions
with constant returns to scale: xi = gi (vji), where gi (·) is the production function
for good i and vji is the use of factor j in the production of good i. Deﬁning
unit input coeﬃcients as aji we also obtain: 1 ≤ gi (aji). Endowment constraints
are then
P
ajixi ≤ vj. From these conditions, we can deﬁne the economy-wide










ajixi ≤ vj and 1 ≤ gi (aji) ∀i,j
)
(14)
From the envelope theorem and the properties of the revenue function r, factor
incomes and goods production can be expressed in terms of the value of the partial
10derivatives of the revenue function, evaluated at the equilibrium set of prices:
∂r(p,v)
∂vj
= wj = wj (p,v) ∀j (15)
∂r(p,v)
∂pi
= xi = xi (p,v) ∀i (16)
Taking equations (15) and (16) in conjunction with equations (13) and (14), we



































∗ + τ = 1 + τ (20)
In equations (17) − (20), we have assumed the home country imposes a tariﬀ of τ
on imports from the rest of the world, while world prices are normalized to one.
In addition, ωh
t is the household share of the tariﬀ revenue and vh
j is the household
ownership share of factor j. In the ﬁrst equation, household consumption is equal
to the household budget. Equation (18) deﬁnes imports on which tariﬀ revenue
is generated and equation (19) sets economy wide expenditure equal to national
income. Together, the system of four equations has an equally dimensioned set of
unknowns: ch,m,e and p.
8A two-country general equilibrium system can readily be formalized using the same frame-
work.
113.2 Household inequality
As explained earlier, the recent literature on trade and the distribution of income
has focused on the functional distribution of income. The functional distribution
of income is also an important building block here for the representation of the
household distribution of income. In equation (21) we deﬁne factor incomes s,
which follow directly from the endowment stock and the properties of the revenue
function.
sj = rvj (p,v)vj = wjvj (21)
Thus, the functional distribution of income is a function of equilibrium prices,
preferences, the production technology and the endowment set. In reduced form,
the functional distribution of income F(s) is then an artifact of the equilibrium
matching of preference and the technology set, given our endowment vector.
F (s) = F (p,v) (22)
Using factor incomes wj and the household ownership share of production factors,
ωh
j we can readily obtain household income. In addition, we include the assign-
ment of import tariﬀ revenue, again represented by a household share parameter.

























τ = 1. In reduced form, the personal distri-
bution of income F(y) is a consequence of the elements aﬀecting the functional
distribution and the h × j ownership matrix of coeﬃcients ωh
j, represented by Ω:
F (y) = F (p,v,Ω) (25)
Note that social welfare is ultimately a function of the ownership matrix in the
economy, while the impact of trade policy will then depend on the interaction of
the underlying economic structure and the ownership matrix.
3.3 Inequality indexes with system fundamentals
We can write our social metrics of the distribution of income –the Atkinson and
Gini indexes– in terms of system fundamentals. Making a substitution from (23)
into (9) and (11), we obtain the following equations:


































































































1. In what follows, we apply the additional normalization that each household
receives an equal share of the tariﬀ revenues, so that ωh
τ = n−1.9
The ratio of the household’s income to per capita income, which accounts
for income dispersion, is given by the sum of the diﬀerences between the actual
ownership share of factors and equal shares for each household. From equations
(26) and (27), we can make a substitution back into equations (10) and (12),


























































4 Trade policy, equity, and welfare
From equations (28) and (29) above, social welfare is a function of the ﬁrst two
moments of the household distribution of income. This is especially obvious with
the Atkinson index, as it is actually the weighted variance of income, with inverse
income weights, that provides the variance component of the social welfare func-
9The distributional impact of tariﬀ revenues can be substantial. This is the emphasis of the
paper by Galor (1994), which includes tariﬀs in his general equilibrium Overlapping-Generations
model.
14tion.10 Because the contributions of the mean and variance components of income
to social welfare are separable in equations (28) and (29), we can decompose the
impact of trade policy as well into its impact on per-capita income (an eﬃciency
eﬀect), and its impact on the variance of income (a distributional eﬀect). To-
gether, they determine the overall social welfare impact. Formally, diﬀerentiating
equations (28) and (29) with respect to tariﬀs, we obtain the following equations:
∂SWA
∂τi


















































How do we interpret equations (30) and (31)? The eﬃciency component is well
known (see for example Dixit and Norman 1980.), and is shown here in equation
(32). Basically, the impact of tariﬀs on per-capita income will depend on the
combination of terms-of-trade and allocation eﬀects (the ﬁrst set of terms in square

























For a small country, negative allocation eﬀects outweigh the terms-of-trade eﬀects,
so that the impact of the tariﬀ on mean income is strictly negative. Also, for the
small country, the impact on the cost of living will be to raise prices. As such,
10While the functional form is diﬀerent, the social welfare function underlying other income
distribution indexes yields a similar result, though with diﬀerent weights in the variance compo-
nent of the welfare function. The CRRA function yields a particularly clear and parsimonious
reduced form.
15the real mean-income eﬀect will be strictly negative for a small country. With
a large country, the combined income and cost-of-living eﬀect, or in other words
the real income eﬀect of the tariﬀ change as represented by the term in square
brackets in the equations (30) and (31) may be positive or negative depending on
the magnitude of terms-of-trade eﬀects.
The impact on household income distribution, the other part of equations (30)














































































Note that we also have an inverse income weighting, by a factor of θ , in equation
(33) applied to induced changes in income. The weighting of induced changes in
income for the Gini index depends on the ranking of individual households on the
relative income scale. Equations (33) and (34) provide an analytical mapping that
we believe may prove useful, empirically, for analysis of linkages between policy-
induced price changes and standard indexes of inequality (in this case the Atkinson
and Gini index). One could apply such a decomposition econometrically, or apply
it to adjust summary welfare measures in CGE models to include equity eﬀects
and to decompose them.
Close inspection of equations (33) and (34) reveals a more general relationship
16between inequality and tariﬀs. In particular, if we deﬁne ethical weights ψ, then




















In this context, assuming we adopt a Sen-type social welfare function (where we
also allow for a marginal utility of income coeﬃcient α) so that our ethical weights





















































In general, changes in household income depend on the set of factor price changes,
ﬁltered by the ownership matrix and our ethical weights, where factor price changes
in turn depend on Stolper-Samuelson derivatives and the induced price changes
that follow from tariﬀ changes. This is expressed in equation (38), where the term
∂βj















We can also represent the relationship in elasticity terms: εβj,τi = εwj,pεp,τi −εy,τi.
174.1 Equity in the 2x2 HOS Model
Assuming that inequality is the result of uneven distribution of an asset that is
indexed by k, we can apply equation (35) to a two-factor, two-good Heckscher-
Ohlin model. In this framework, equation (39) determines the impact of tariﬀ

















Inequality is purely a function of the allocation of assets in this model. At the
same time, the impact of the tariﬀ is then a function of which sector is protected.
If protection leads to a drop in asset income, inequality is reduced. Alternatively, if
asset income is protected, we will see a rise in inequality. Note that our discussion
in terms of assets includes both the 2x2 capital-labor and 2x2 skilled-unskilled
versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model found in the literature on the functional
distribution of income. The interpretation of βk with physical capital is obvious.
If we instead are working with skilled and unskilled labor in the 2x2 model, then the
return to skill as an asset will be βk = [βs − nsn−1βu] where βs is the income share
of skilled labor, interpreted as including both the basic labor and skill component
of skilled labor income, and where s and u index skilled and unskilled workers. 11
Substituting skill for capital, we will arrive at equation (39).
While inequality depends on relative factor incomes, the social welfare eﬀect
11Formally, assume ﬁrst that unskilled labor earns wu and skilled labor earns ws, where wu <
ws. We can then decompose the skilled labor price into two components, such that ws = wu +
(ws − wu). If we deﬁne skill as an asset with return rk, then we can now deﬁne rk = (ws − wu).
Viewed this way, all households have been endowed with a claim on income equal to the price of
a unit of basic labor earning wu, while some have also been endowed with a claim on the income
of a unit of skill. The distribution of this claim on skill income is then the source of inequality.
In share terms, we will have βs = nsn−1
u βu + βk, or, βk = βs − nsn−1
u βu.
18will depend on the trade-oﬀ between real income eﬀects following from import
protection, and the impact on inequality. In other words, the trade-oﬀ between
equity and eﬃciency. From equations (36) and (37), this is ultimately a function
of the degree of inequality aversion, combined with the structural features of the
economy and its market power on world markets. For a small country, real income
eﬀects will be strictly negative, while inequality eﬀects may be positive or nega-
tive, depending on the relative endowment structure of the economy. For a large
country, it is possible for both eﬀects to work in the same direction. However, in
this case, note that positive terms-of-trade gains will slow any rise (or slow any
fall) in capital income shares, from equation (38). This in turn means that terms
of trade eﬀects will tend to mitigate the inequality eﬀects of protection.
On the basis of equations (38) and (39), we can summarize our discussion above
with the following observations about import protection and inequality in the 2x2
Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Proposition 1. In a small 2x2 economy with inequality determined by uneven
distribution of assets (capital or skill), tariﬀs will cause inequality to rise (fall) if
assets in the economy are relatively scarce (abundant).
If we take the factor in the 2x2 model that is unevenly distributed as assets
(capital or skill), then from equation (39), changes in inequality indexes depend
strictly on a weighted sum of the change in the share of income going to those
assets,
∂βk
∂τi . From the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the income share of those assets
will rise (fall) with a tariﬀ if the economy is asset poor (rich). Weights are assigned





in both the Atkinson and the Gini case. This means
19that the change in incomes for households holding more capital than average or
households holding skilled labor, and hence more income than average, determine
the sign of the income eﬀect. As a result we will have a rise (fall) in equality as a
capital poor (rich) country imposes a tariﬀ.
On the basis of Proposition 1 we can immediately make the following state-
ments about asset rich and poor Heckscher-Ohlin economies.
Corollary 2. In a small asset-poor Heckscher-Ohlin economy, where the mean
real-income eﬀects of import protection are negative, we have a magniﬁcation eﬀect.
The eﬀect of import protection on welfare through mean income is magniﬁed by the
impact through inequality. Because of this magniﬁcation eﬀect, net eﬀects remain
unambiguous and negative.
Corollary 3. In a small, asset-rich Heckscher-Ohlin economy, where the mean
real-income eﬀects of import protection are negative, we have a mitigation eﬀect.
The eﬀect of import protection on welfare through mean income is at least partially
oﬀset by the impact through inequality. From Proposition 1 and equations (30)
and (31) the net welfare eﬀect is ambiguous. It depends on the speciﬁcation and
parameterization of the underlying social welfare function.
Corollary 4. The impact of protection on inequality as measured by the Atkinson
and Gini indexes will be weaker, in a Heckscher-Ohlin economy, for large countries.
This is because of terms of trade eﬀects from equation (38), which will dampen the
goods-price to factor-price transmission mechanisms at play.
Corollary 2 ﬂags a magniﬁcation eﬀect, linking eﬃciency and inequality eﬀects,
in labour abundant economies. In contrast, we instead have an oﬀsetting eﬀect in
capital-abundant economies, as noted in Corollary 3. This result means that, in the
202x2 model, the impact of tariﬀs on welfare can be ambiguous for small economies
when inequality matters. This stands in contrast to a standard result of the classic
2x2 model, where tariﬀs are unambiguously welfare-reducing for small countries.
Corollary 4 follows because our tariﬀ analytics are driven by the transmission of
tariﬀ changes into price changes, and these are weaker in larger economies. These
smaller internal price eﬀects mean smaller inequality eﬀects.
4.2 Equity in the Speciﬁc Factors Model
Next, consider the speciﬁc factors model. We can make a similar manipulation
of equation (35), yielding equation (39), for the standard 2-good, 3-factor model.
This yields equation (40) below. Again, if we assume that inequality follows from
the ownership pattern of (speciﬁc) assets (ki)), then in this case a shift in income
shares through protection from more to less concentrated factors (in terms of the
concentration of factor ownership) yields a reduction in inequality. The same
points then follow, as before, with regard to country size and inequality eﬀects
in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Otherwise, the impact of protection on inequality

























We can summarize our results with respect to the Ricardo-Viner model as follows:
Proposition 5. In a small 2x3 Ricardo-Viner economy, with inequality deter-
mined by uneven distribution of both speciﬁc factors, if assets represent shares in
the combined portfolio of speciﬁc capital, tariﬀs will cause inequality to fall if the
collective income share of both speciﬁc factors falls, implying also that the share
21for the mobile factor will also rise.
From equation (40), changes in inequality indexes depend strictly on a weighted
sum of the change in the share of income going to both forms of sector-speciﬁc
assets,
∂βki
∂τi . Weights are assigned to households that are inversely monotonic in




. This means that
the change in incomes for households holding more assets than average, and hence
more income than average, determine the sign of the income eﬀect. As a result we
will have a fall in inequality as long as all asset income shares decline.
Proposition 6. Unless the conditions in Proposition 5 are met, the impact of
protection on inequality as measured by the Gini or Atkinson index, like the impact
of a tariﬀ on income for the mobile factor itself, is ambiguous in the Ricardo-Viner
model when speciﬁc factor ownership patterns are the source of inequality.
Proposition 6 follows from the need to sign the ﬁnal terms in square brackets in
equation (40). In the special case covered by Proposition 5, we can unambiguously
make a statement about inequality. In the more general case however, we can
generate examples where the tariﬀ-induced changes in the speciﬁc-factor share of
income may vary in sign between the two sectors. Depending on the distribution
of ownership, functional forms, and the share of unskilled labor in total income
in the benchmark, inequality may then rise or fall. For example, in a developing
country where the poor have unskilled labor and land, and the rich unskilled labor
and capital, protection will make the concentration of income worse, assuming
the sector using capital is an import-competing sector. On the other hand, if
ownership of land is very highly concentrated relative to capital, import protection
may improve the distribution of income.
22Following from Proposition 6 and equations (30) and (31), we can state that
in the standard 2x3 model, if the induced change in inequality is large enough
and of the correct sign, it can oﬀset the impact of the change in average income
levels. This all depends on the underlying functional forms in the model and the
parameterization of the social welfare function. If inequality is not improved, then
the worsening inequality magniﬁes the negative eﬃciency eﬀects of small-country
tariﬀ incidence. This is summarized as follows.
Corollary 7. In a small Ricardo-Viner country, import protection may be welfare
improving even though average incomes will fall.
5 Equity concerns in a lobbying framework
At this point, we could invoke a variety of diﬀerent political economy models to
generate political underpinnings for the setting of an equilibrium tariﬀ in the po-
litical marketplace. These models have been extensively analyzed in the recent
literature12, and following Helpman Helpman (1995) we note that many of these
can be represented, in reduced form, by the now standard political support func-
tion.
Direct democracy is a rare political mechanism and public policies are more
usually decided by representative governments that balance conﬂicting interests.
From Hillman (1989) we know that when one of the factors is suﬃciently con-
centrated across only a few households, these individuals can organize to form
pressure groups and overcome the free-rider problem. In such cases, Grossman
and Helpman have demonstrated that in the reduced form the policy maker has
12See for example Helpman (1995) and Grossman and Helpman (2002).
23two arguments to consider: the general interest and the interest of special groups
(for example capital owners and unions). The interest of the government can
follow from electoral support when social welfare is increasing and electoral con-
tributions go with lobbying. For example, in the 2x2 model, investors in a poor
labor-abundant country can oﬀer a contribution to induce the policy-maker to
increase import protection.
The precise weight the policy maker assigns to each group is established by her
political support function, as in equation (41).
U (τi) = λ1SW (τi) + λ2ρ(τi) (41)
where U is the policy-maker’s utility, ρ represents (lobbying) rents generated for
government through protection, and where we assume that the tariﬀ level is the
only policy instrument of the government. The weights λ characterize the political
system (how important are the contributions for the electoral campaign) and the
policy-makers’ preferences (how she values reelection against more contributions).
Conditional on the particular values of these weights, she maximizes her utility












∂τi has been already deﬁned in equations (36) and (37). Since ρ is
the fraction of the capital/asset rents that are assigned to political contributions,
∂ρ(τi)
∂τi > 0 until the optimum tariﬀ for investors is reached. (See Mayer 1984.)
The additional element in the political mixture here is the eﬀect of the tariﬀ on





. From equations (36) and (37) the tariﬀ
impact on an inequality-adjusted social welfare function can induce changes to the
standard results of the political support model. Thus, there is not necessarily a
trade-oﬀ between both right hand side terms in equation (41) and in some cases
they can reinforce each other.
If we analyze small open economies and consider only the social welfare impli-
cations (or identically where λ2 = 0), when the distributional eﬀect of the tariﬀ
compensates for more than the eﬃciency losses incurred we will observe a posi-
tive optimum tariﬀ rate. From Corollary 3, in the 2x2 case this can hold only
for capital-abundant countries. On the other hand, from Corollary 2, in poor 2x2
countries the distributional and eﬃciency eﬀects reinforce each other and the so-
cially optimum tariﬀ is zero, though the equilibrium rate may be positive when
λ2 > 0. In a speciﬁc factors setting (see below) things are less clear-cut.
When the inﬂuence of special interest groups is introduced, the previous partial
results can change. In a capital-abundant 2x2 country, the capital-owners have an
incentive to lower tariﬀs, and if the workers can organize, they lobby to increase
tariﬀs. The ﬁnal outcome depends on the speciﬁc rents each group obtains and
its political inﬂuence. In labor-abundant 2x2 countries positive tariﬀs can be
explained by the presence of an eﬀective lobby, and in capital rich countries they
can be explained by equity concerns that partially overcome free trade lobbying.
These multiple outcomes are summarized as follows:
Proposition 8. In a Hecksher-Ohlin world, with homogeneous labor owners, con-
centrated capital and a policy-maker that cares about equity and assigns no weight
to political contributions, the government’s optimum tariﬀ is higher in capital-
25abundant countries than in labor-abundant countries.
From Proposition 1, tariﬀs will lead to a rise (fall) in inequality depending on
whether a country is capital rich (poor). In conjunction with equations (28) and
(29), this means that tariﬀs have a positive (negative) impact on welfare, all other
things equal, in capital rich (poor) countries mapped through inequality eﬀects.
Hence tariﬀs are better for social welfare than represented by mean eﬀects alone
in rich countries, and worse in poor countries. This means that the government’s
optimum tariﬀ is then higher in capital-abundant countries than in labor-abundant
countries.
Starting from Proposition 8, once we introduce a non-zero weight for lobbyists
(λ2 > 0) we can then have the following corollaries.
Corollary 9. In a Hecksher-Ohlin capital-abundant economy, with relatively greater
inequality aversion, while capital owners will lobby for lower tariﬀs, the govern-
ment will be relatively more protectionist because of equity reasons than otherwise.
Equity concerns then oﬀset to some extent pressure for lower tariﬀs in the political
marketplace.
Corollary 10. In a Hecksher-Ohlin labor-abundant economy, with relatively greater
inequality aversion, the government will favor relatively lower tariﬀs for equity and
eﬃciency reasons, but will be lobbied by capitalists for higher tariﬀs. Equity con-
cerns then oﬀset to some extent pressure for higher tariﬀs in the political market-
place.
Basically, when the distributional eﬀects are not signiﬁcant enough to upset the
eﬃciency losses imposed by the tariﬀ, the common results of the literature remain
qualitatively unscathed: higher tariﬀs are directly associated with the weight and
26the contributions of special interest groups. At the same time though, in the pres-
ence of distributional concerns rich countries tend to impose higher tariﬀs than
otherwise. Relatively high average tariﬀs across a subset of capital-rich countries
can then be seen as a consequence of greater inequality considerations by the rele-
vant policy-makers, as well as the presence of inﬂuential unions. Hence, Corollary
9 provides an equity basis for a protectionist bias in capital-rich countries, sup-
plementing the Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) bias based on uncertainty. Indeed
aversion to uncertainty, as emphasized by Fernandez and Rodrik, can leads directly
to a complimentary aversion to inequality as well. In contrast, in poor countries
positive tariﬀ rates are a direct consequence of the investor lobby overcoming both
equity and eﬃciency concerns of the government. In developing countries with a
political system that assigns a signiﬁcantly higher weight to social welfare than
average, tariﬀs should remain lower than otherwise.13
A similar analytical exercise can be carried out with a 2x3 speciﬁc-factors
model. In particular, ignoring equity concerns, we have an equilibrium tariﬀ that
balances the eﬃciency eﬀects of the tariﬀ against the interests of owners of sector 1
and sector 2 capital. However, unlike the results for the Heckscher-Ohlin model we
developed here, we will not then have unambiguous results when we add inequality
to the policy objective mix. This is because, from Proposition 3, the inequality
impact of a tariﬀ may itself be ambiguous. If a tariﬀ reduces inequality in the
region of the political equilibrium, we would again expect the equity-conscious
13These results oﬀer a diﬀerent orientation on the protection-inequality problem from Dutt
and Mitra (2001). In their paper, Dutt and Mitra focus on the median voter model, emphasizing
the impact of capital allocation itself on the pattern of protection. In labor abundant countries,
increased inequality in a median-voter setting then implies lower protection. One point of our
analysis here, whether in a median-voter or lobbying framework, is that inequality and tariﬀs
will be determined endogenously if the government also places some weight on social welfare.
27government to be more protectionist than otherwise. If not, we expect the opposite
to hold. Like real wage eﬀects, inequality eﬀects also prove ambiguous in the 3x2
model, so that functional forms and parameters (or in the real world: preferences,
technologies and endowments) all need to be given weight before an answer can
be given.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a dual theoretical framework for exploring linkages between
import protection and the household distribution of income. This complements
the existing literature that links trade policy to factor incomes and the functional
distribution of income, which is well developed in the literature. The main insight
of this literature is provided by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and constitutes a
ﬁrst step in our analysis. In a general equilibrium context, tariﬀ changes ultimately
aﬀect the household distribution through variations in ownership patters in con-
junction with Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects. To model ownership structures, we used
the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner trade models. Within both frameworks, we
are then able to produce theoretical predictions between trade protection, country
size, level of development, and personal income inequality.
Another contribution of this paper is that we examine the formal link between
social welfare and the equilibrium determinants of the distribution of income.
Using Sen-type social welfare functions, we decompose the general equilibrium
welfare eﬀects of import protection into real income level and distribution compo-
nents. Depending on the representation of risk/inequality aversion, the dispersion
component can be represented exactly through use of the Gini or Atkinson in-
28equality indexes. With these explicit inequality derivatives we map import protec-
tion to inequality-adjusted welfare. In addition, when standard trade models are
employed this framework also yields predictions relating social welfare with pro-
tection, country size and levels of development. In conjunction with the relevant
inequality index, the general form of the decomposition of welfare and inequality
we develop here may also be useful for producing summary measures of distribu-
tional impacts in applied general equilibrium applications focused on inequality.
Once the distributional eﬀects of trade liberalization are determined, we can
apply endogenous tariﬀ formation models to assess how the optimum tariﬀ is af-
fected by equity concerns. In representative democratic systems, we ﬁnd that
positive optimum tariﬀs can be sustained in capital-abundant countries even when
the policy-maker assigns a low or zero weight to the contributions of special inter-
ests groups. In this case, the positive distributional eﬀect of import protection can
oﬀset or compensate the eﬃciency losses of reduced trade. In poor countries, char-
acterized by the relative abundance of labor, positive tariﬀs are explained by the
inﬂuence of special interest groups (i.e. capitalists) that heavily lobby for higher
tariﬀs. Thus, import protection in developing countries not only diminishes social
welfare through eﬃciency and equity considerations, but also signals the economic
and political weight of the capital-owners.
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